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Abstract
English translations of the New Testament (NT) consistently render the Greek term 
hamartia and its cognates as “sin.” English translations of other Greek texts dated to 
roughly the same time period, however, provide a variety of English words such as 
“mistake,” error,” or “things we get wrong,” to accommodate contextual nuances. This 
essay argues that this bifurcation has several unappealing consequences for the study 
of Christian beginnings. The palpable difference in translation portrays the NT texts 
as unique departures from the moral discourse of the time and reifies an unnecessary 
divide between early Christian and other kinds of moral literature, while the unquali-
fied use of the English word sin brings with it the possibility that readers will import 
more unified theological doctrines about sin onto texts written well before the doc-
trines were even developed.
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Despite efforts to redescribe the beginnings of Christianity in a way that 
adheres to more rigorous theoretical and methodological standards of his-
torical inquiry, there still remains a problem in the way the text of the NT is 
 Versions of this essay have been read at the 2010 NAASR panel, “Translation, Anachronism, and 
Ideology in Scholarship on Early Christianity,” the 2011 Constructing Christianity Conference 
at the University of South Carolina, and at the January 2012 meeting of the Center for the 
Ancient Mediterranean at Columbia University. William V. Harris and Heike Sefrin-Weis read 
and commented on drafts at various stages.
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currently packaged for English-speaking consumers: the translation of cer-
tain words reflects theological concepts that would not necessarily have been 
within the range of possible meanings for ancient authors and audiences.1 
The choice of certain English terms implies the existence in antiquity of a set 
of social, religious, and theological interests that, while readily comprehen-
sible and applicable to modern sensibilities, does not necessarily align with 
historically plausible interpretations. Students and scholars interested in the 
ways that ancient authors and audiences could have understood certain con-
cepts could benefit from an awareness of the extent to which modern concepts 
have become embedded in current English translations.2
In 1989, the NRSV was released to replace the 1946 RSV, and currently is 
used widely in university, seminary, and divinity school classrooms because 
it is thought to be one of the better—if not the best—academic translations 
available. Nevertheless, the NRSV’s translation of certain Greek words serves 
to reinforce particular modern ideologies. One example is the deliberate and 
consistent use of gender-inclusive language in the NRSV, which yields puzzling 
and inconsistent results (Kraemer et al. forthcoming). In the NRSV, unlike the 
RSV, the Greek term adelphoi (brothers) has a fairly broad semantic range, 
including “brothers and sisters,” “people,” “friends,” “fellow Israelites,” “family,” 
“ believers,” “relatives,” and “comrades.” This gender inclusivity shows up dis-
proportionately in the NT, giving the impression that the early Christians rep-
resented therein were attuned to modern sensibilities about gender inclusivity. 
By contrast, English translations of nearly all other literature of the time, be it 
within Greek, Judean, or non-canonical early Christian texts, do not employ 
consistent gender-inclusive language, with the implication being that only 
those Christians thought to be represented in the pages of the canonical NT 
were practicing gender inclusion/equality.
In addition to the case of adelphoi, there are other problematic translations 
such as the transformation of pneuma from a physical substance into a dis-
tinct personal being, the polemical translation of ta ethnē as “pagan,” and the 
reification of the rather nebulous social formation, called ekklēsia in Greek, 
1  Of course, there are many ways to approach biblical interpretation and not everyone will 
see this as a problem. Those with commitments to at least some of the principles of histori-
cal criticism, though, will likely understand and acknowledge the pitfalls of anachronistic 
 translation.
2  The students and scholars I have in mind need not only be imagined as those at secular 
institutions, for as Dale Martin has clearly shown, the methods and assumptions of histori-
cal criticism exist within seminaries and divinity schools across the theological spectrum 
(Martin, 2008).
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into a full-scale institution called, anachronistically, a “church” (Eyl, this vol-
ume). There is also hamartia, a term that has enjoyed a fairly flexible semantic 
range throughout its history, except for its appearances in the NT. If the variety 
of English terms used to translate adelphoi marks the canonical texts of early 
Christianity out as unique among other literature regarding an ideology of 
gender inclusivity, the singular translation of hamartia marks it out as unique 
regarding its persistent interest in sin.3
There exist many Greek texts from the first century that do not deal with the 
early Jesus movement or Christ-followers but nevertheless also utilize the word 
hamartia and its cognates. Except in the cases of texts specifically address-
ing Judean traditions (such as Philo of Alexandria and Josephus), though, 
one would be hard-pressed to detect—in English translations—that authors 
such as Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, or Plutarch, shared with the authors of NT 
texts an interest in sin. In the same way that gender inclusive translations of 
adelphoi depict early Christians as unique in their sensitivity to a more mod-
ern issue, translations of hamartia depict them as unique in their interest in 
the problem of sin and, consequently, its allegedly inevitable solution through 
Jesus Christ. I suggest that the palpable differences between translations of 
ancient philosophical texts, on the one hand, and ancient religious texts, on 
the other, likely stem from modern ideas about the essentially religious or 
theological nature of the English word sin; underlying this problem, though, 
is the added complication of the categorization of ancient texts as either “reli-
gious” or “philosophical,” which belies the more modern idea that religion, the-
ology, and philosophy were discrete fields in antiquity. The essay begins with 
a brief description of the ways that the English word sin is depicted in con-
temporary discourse in order to show that sin is commonly understood to be a 
religious concept; further, it points out that the categorization of sin solely as 
a religious term is at odds with ancient Greek usage, where the term is found 
in both religious and non-religious contexts. The next section focuses on the 
evolution of hamartia to show its semantic flexibility and introduces a debate 
concerning Aristotle’s use of hamartia as an analogue for the kind of semantic 
expansion that I suggest. Finally, the essay concludes with some general com-
ments about the Pauline corpus and a discussion about 1 Corinthians as test 
case for my proposal that hamartia need not invariably be translated as “sin.”
3  The only exceptions are Acts 25:8, where the NRSV translates hēmarton as “committed an 
offense” and the RSV as “offended,” and 1 Peter 2:20, where the NRSV translates hamartanon-
tes as “doing wrong” and the RSV as “do wrong.”
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1 “Sin” in Contemporary Discourse
In contemporary English usage, the term sin functions as a specifically religious 
term. This holds true for popular use as well as for more technical academic 
contexts. A survey of popular dictionaries, encyclo-, and wiki- pedias shows 
sin to be the term that designates a willful offense against God, God’s will, or 
at least against the human moral codes modeled after God’s will.4 Examples 
include sin as a “transgression of divine law; the sin of Adam”;5 “an offense 
against religious or moral law,” “transgression of the law of God,” “a vitiated 
state of human nature in which the self is estranged to God.”6 Along similar 
lines, the Oxford English Dictionary defines sin as “an act which is regarded as 
a transgression of the divine law and an offense against God; a violation (esp. 
willful or deliberate) of some religious or moral principle.”7 Solidifying the con-
nection between sin and religion in popular discourse, is the featured illustra-
tion on the Wikipedia entry for sin: a fresco detail from the Sistine Chapel, 
which “depicts the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden for 
their sin of eating from the fruit of the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil.”8 
Additionally, one may learn on this page that “atheism often draws a distinc-
tion between sin and an ethical code of conduct” and, “as the term is generally 
associated with theological belief, atheists do not typically use the word.”9
Similarly, resources for religion and theology claim “sin” as a technical term 
of their own and associate it explicitly with the kind of wrongdoing that is 
disruptive to human relations with the divine. Drawing upon ideas about 
the universal anxiety of humankind expressed by authors such as Mircea 
Eliade, Paul Ricoeur, Martin Heidegger, and E. R. Dodd, the entry on sin and 
guilt in The Encyclopedia of Religion states that, “In short, from being anxious, 
man became unhappy, stricken with guilt feelings about an initial accident 
that is repeated endlessly throughout human existence and can be called 
‘sin’ . . .[sin and guilt] come in a great variety of shades, according to the various 
4  While a brief survey of online reference tools is not a comprehensive report on popular usage 
of the word, it does offer some degree of insight into popular understanding.
5  “sin,” Online: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sin [accessed on January 21, 2013]. The 
second definition emphasizes willful intent and broadens the scope to include “some reli-
gious or moral principle.”
 6  “sin,” Online: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sin [accessed on January 21, 
2013].
7  “sin,” Online: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/180030?result=1&rskey=2yftIf& [accessed on 
January 21, 2013].
 8  “sin,” Online: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sin [accessed on January 21, 2013].
9  “sin,” Online: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sin [accessed on January 21, 2013].
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sensitivities represented by the great number of religious and philosophical 
feelings and  systems” (LaCocque 1995: 325). After a brief introduction to 
humanity’s primitive interest in magic, myth, and the more general category 
of the numinous, the entry is divided into sections covering Mesopotamian 
religion, the religions of Israel, the Greeks, the Christian Church, and Islam. 
Thus the overall impression is that sin is a specifically religious problem, 
mainly found within the trajectory defined by an insider account of the history 
of Christianity. In other words, the entry essentially traces a version of the con-
cept of sin through the usual Christian stages, beginning with Mesopotamian 
and Israelite myth and religion,10 touching upon “the Greeks,” and then offering 
a description of sin in the Christian church (Irenaeus, Origen, and Augustine). 
Finally, the entry concludes with a brief paragraph on Islam. Taken together, 
the Encyclopedia’s discussion of sin defines it as a universal human problem 
that is expressed primarily within the domain of religion (and more specifi-
cally, within those of the  Abrahamic tradition).
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy also connects sin to Abrahamic 
religious traditions: “The concept of sin is the concept of a human fault that 
offends a good God and brings with it human guilt. Its natural home is in the 
major theistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam” (Quinn 1998: 791).11 
The entry then moves into a discussion of “actual sin” as individual human acts 
of wrongdoing. Some acts, like murder, are morally wrong in themselves and 
yet are “doubly wrong [i.e., sinful] when forbidden by God” (Quinn 1998: 792). 
Other actions, such as not showing gratitude to God, are neither morally wrong 
nor sinful apart from the existence of a beneficent God. A third kind of “actual 
sin” stands apart from morality altogether and are labeled wrong only in a par-
ticular religious context wherein God has decreed a particular kind of practice 
(worshipping on one day as opposed to another, for example). The entry goes 
on to distinguish between “objective and subjective actual sin,” but my point 
in mentioning the three-fold categorization of actual sin is to highlight the fact 
10   And yet the section on the religions of Israel concludes thusly, “In summary, the final 
answer to our guilt, according to the New Testament, is given by the death of Christ which 
overcomes our state of sin and guilt and thereby inaugurates the kingdom of God on 
earth” (LaCoque 1995: 328-329).
11   The entry details the differences between the three Abrahamic traditions as follows: “In 
the Hebrew Bile, sin is understood within the context of the covenantal relation between 
Yahweh and his chosen people. To be in covenant with Yahweh is to exist in holiness, and 
so sin is a deviation from the norms of holiness. In the Christian New Testament, Jesus 
teaches that human wrongdoing offends the one whom he calls Father. The Qur’an por-
trays sin as opposition to Allah rooted in human pride” (Quinn 1998: 792). As we will see, 
however, this is an over-simplification that under-emphasizes non-religious aspects.
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that the author has subtly, yet consistently, differentiated between actions that 
are morally wrong and those that are sinful; moral wrongs need not (but can) 
involve a religious context, whereas sins necessitate one.12
That contemporary resources isolate religious from non-religious concep-
tions of wrongdoing by associating sin with willful offenses against God is 
not, in itself, problematic. It is simply the way the term has evolved in con-
temporary usage, possibly reflecting ideas about religion as a discrete, iden-
tifiable, realm or sphere of activity. The problem at issue in this essay is not 
contemporary popular usage of the term, but rather is that translators have not 
critically examined whether the source language is properly represented by 
the choices in the target language.13 Uncritical acceptance of the sameness of 
contemporary Christian conceptions of sin and the semantic range of hamar-
tia, though, is merely one aspect of a type of biblical criticism that Stanley K. 
Stowers has recently termed “academic Christian theological modernism,” one 
of the defining characteristics of which is that the “religion, morals, sociality, 
and subjectivity, [of] the early Christians are the same as us. They are the same 
people in different clothes, with a different ‘science.’ The early Christians are 
not only generally the same as modern Europeans, but also the same as the 
professors and Christian scholars who study them in their focus on spiritual-
ized intellectual interests, that is, doctrines, theology, and ideas” (Stowers 2011: 
106-107). In the case of translation practice, the assumed sameness can refer 
to many of these variables; in the case of hamartia in New Testament texts 
(and especially in Paul) the problematic assumption is that it is a technical 
term that designates a robust and unified theological doctrine of human sin, 
whose only viable solution is salvation through Jesus Christ. Before turning to 
12   The Routledge Encyclopedia is not alone in its identification of sin as a religious/ 
theological concept. See, for example, the definition of sin in the Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy: “A moral category going beyond that of simple wrongdoing by its implica-
tions of evil, disobedience, depravity, stain, and wickedness. Sin therefore requires atone-
ment, penitence, and self- abasement, not to mention punishment. The abjection and 
lack of self-respect implied in the cluster of ideas serve to emphasize the importance of 
redemption. They are therefore an important buttress to the power of those who claim to 
know how to provide it. The concept is only at home in a religious tradition built around 
the possibility of God’s disgust, and is not found pure and simple in classical thought, 
where offences were equally liable to divine vengeance whether voluntary or not” 
(Blackburn 2005: 340).
13   Although my focus in this essay is on translators of “religious” texts, who overdo their use 
of the word “sin,” translators of “philosophical” texts, who mostly resist using the word, 
are also complicit in reifying the boundaries between what we now take to be essentially 
“religious” and “philosophical” texts.
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the New Testament, though, a discussion of the history and flexibility of the 
term hamartia is in order.
We have seen that the English term sin functions in a fairly specific way 
to designate either a kind of human error that arouses varying levels of dis-
approval from a deity, or an inborn feeling of guilt or emotional pain that is 
expressed within religious or theological contexts. As such, the use of the word 
sin is not necessarily the best choice for wrong actions that do not involve direct 
deviation from divine decree, do not arouse the ire or displeasure of a deity, 
or are otherwise not associated with theological/soteriological  consequences.14 
With reference to the use of hamartia in our source language, however, we will 
see in the next section that the situation is not nearly as  precise.
2 Hamartia: Evolution and Flexibility
The Greek noun hamartia and its cognates have been in use since Homer, and 
tracing the evolution of the use of the term up through Aristotle shows three 
main categories of meaning, none of which specifies an exclusively religious 
one that corresponds to modern popular and scholarly usage. First is the origi-
nal, literal sense, commonly translated into English as “miss,” meaning physi-
cally to miss something, to fall short, or go astray of a goal or target. Homer 
used the word frequently in battle scenes, to conjure images of hitting or miss-
ing intended targets (Bremer 1969: 30-31). This meaning is most prominent 
from the 9th to the 5th centuries BCE, but with declining frequency, with the 
result that neither the Septuagint nor the NT use the word in its literal sense.
In the 5th century BCE, the writings of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, 
Herodotus and Thucydides show a decided movement toward two other 
senses of hamartia, usually translated as “err” and “offend.” “Error” relates to 
actions stemming from good intentions but which nevertheless fail to meet 
their intended goals; “errors” are basically mistakes that do not result from 
any ill will or intentional deviation from a moral standard. “Offenses,” how-
ever, amount to moral deviation because of the willful nature of actions such 
as intentional law-breaking, harm, or other such series offenses. Even here, 
though, the sense of hamartia need not be linked exclusively with divine 
moral standards or punishment. This does not mean that divinities were not 
thought to be associated with human immorality, for there was a popular belief 
that offenses (hamartēmata or hamartiai) were recorded by Zeus. Similarly, in 
the 5th century hamartia could refer to actions that provoke the gods to take 
14   Cases of civic law-breaking, for example, are commonly called crimes rather than sins.
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revenge, but this frequency does not allow us to conclude that every use of the 
term requires this interpretation (Bremer 1969: 31-47).
It was in the 4th century BCE, especially in the writings of Aristotle, that 
occurrences of hamartia and its cognates were seen to relate to morality and 
agency in a more sophisticated way.15 Aristotle’s discussions of the relation-
ship between hamartia and other terms such as adikia (wrongdoing, injustice) 
and atuchia (misfortune, mishap) in the Nichomachean Ethics are of particu-
lar importance, as is his treatment of the role of hamartia in tragedy in the 
Poetics. We turn first to the topic of the difference between hamartia, adikia, 
and  atuchia. Aristotle explains:
There being three kinds of harm, then, in interactions, the cases where 
ignorance is a factor are mistakes [hamartēmata], i.e., when the person 
affected, or the action itself, or the instrument, or the effect is not what 
the agent supposed, because he did not think he was hitting the other 
person, or not with this, or not this person, or not with this effect, but 
turned out not to be the effect he thought (e.g., he had it in mind not 
to wound, but only to nudge) . . . Now when the harm occurs contrary 
to reasonable expectation, it is a misfortune [atuchēma]; when it could 
reasonably have been expected, but is inflicted without bad intent, it is 
a mistake [hamartēma] (since it is a mistake when the origin of what 
causes the effect lies in the agent, but a misfortune when it is outside 
him); when a person inflicts harm knowingly but without prior delibera-
tion, it is an unjust act [adikēma], e.g., things done through temper and 
other affections that are inevitable or natural for human beings, since 
those who inflict harm or go wrong [hamartanontes] in this way are 
doing what is unjust, and theirs are unjust acts, yet this does not mean 
that they themselves are unjust, or bad characters, because the harm did 
not come about because of badness; and when the harm is inflicted as a 
result of decision, then the doer is unjust [adikos] and a bad character 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1135b11-26, Rowe).
In this passage, Aristotle has categorized three kinds of harm, introduced the 
idea of agency, and considered the nature of intent.
15   Although Plato does use the term in moral and ethical ways, neither he nor other writers 
from the 4th century offer an explicit differentiation of the ways hamartia may be used 
or how it could be distinguished from related terminology, such as adikia (Bremer 1969: 
47-52). 
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One kind of harm is the misfortune or accident (atuchēma); a misfortune 
is something that befalls a person, is unexpected, and is not related to intent 
or agency. Another sort of harm is an unjust act (adikēma), and unlike mis-
fortunes, unjust acts are related to agency. The first kind of agency would be 
when a person loses control of her emotions or is otherwise out of control 
(in an akratic state) and purposefully harms someone or causes damage. She 
is responsible for her actions and initiated them with the intent to harm, but 
later, after returning to her normal condition, realizes that she did something 
wrong and may regret it. The second kind of agency initiating an unjust act 
also involves an intent to do damage or harm, but unlike the first case, the 
agent is not under the sway of fluctuating passions; instead, this kind of harm 
is done because bad character (kakia) and malicious intent motivated the 
action. In both cases the resulting action is unjust, damaging, and wrong; the 
agent hit her intended target and thus did not commit hamartia. The second 
case, though, is worse because the person cannot realize, after the fact, that the 
outcome was wrong; save for a major moral turnaround, this is simply a bad 
 person. With the first case, although the agent hits her intended target (causes 
harm) while she is out of control, upon coming to her senses nevertheless feels 
that something went awry; perhaps this is why Aristotle says that those who 
go wrong in this manner (hamartanontes), even though they committed an 
unjust act, nevertheless made a mistake.
The idea that harm can come about through some kind of mistake brings us 
closer to the meaning of hamartia. Unlike a misfortune (atuchēma) and unlike 
the unjust act (adikēma), the mistake involves no ill intent. We saw that the 
unjust act may come about in two ways, but the variables that trigger mistakes 
are innumerable. One example of a mistake would be intending to nudge a per-
son but ending up wounding them (maybe the person you nudged was stand-
ing on an unstable surface and they ended up falling down and getting hurt); 
the intended aim was to get the person’s attention but the result was that the 
person became injured. The nature of the intent was by no means malicious, 
but unlike the non-malicious doer of an unjust act, the person who makes a 
mistake is not necessarily under the duress of temper, passion, or  akrasia more 
generally. Instead, these actions could be described as cases where an agent 
chooses a well- or neutrally- intended16 course of action that fails or “misses 
16   By neutrally-intended I simply mean not having a bad intention. Not all mistakes stem 
from someone’s trying to do something morally good, but could relate to actions we 
would say have little to no moral value, such as hitting the clutch instead of the break 
when driving a car with which one is unfamiliar.
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the mark,” so to speak. Hamartēmata, then, are not necessarily willfully mali-
cious deeds stemming from ill-intent. We have already established that when 
harm occurs due to an external impetus out of the control of the agent, it is not 
a mistake but rather a misfortune (atuchēma), and that harm resulting from ill-
will or an akratic state is an injustice (adikia). How does it happen, though, that 
a well-intended action could do harm without the agent’s being a bad person?
As mentioned above, a particular course of action can lead to a mistaken 
result in several different ways. In his consideration of tragedy, Aristotle con-
siders the number of ways that mistakes can happen; a good tragedy depends 
not upon a bad person ending up in ruins, but rather a well-intentioned per-
son (otherwise the audience would have no sympathy or pity for him). Here, 
I introduce two ways that from well- or neutrally- intentioned decisions can 
go wrong: (a) ignorance of a fact or (b) lapse in judgment (Sherman 1992: 
185-186). Oedipus, for example, intentionally killed a stranger who turned 
out to be his father. This was the result of a case of mistaken identity, which 
amounts to ignorance of a fact. Phaedra, however, who voiced her love for her 
stepson Hippolytus to someone who betrayed her trust, illustrates a classic case 
of poor judgment and not ignorance of a fact. Although neither Oedipus nor 
Phaedra would be considered morally bereft or culpable, both were respon-
sible in a causal way for the tragic outcomes, and the nature of the causal rela-
tionship (and thus the nature of the mistake) was different for each. One was 
a mistaken belief stemming from ignorance of a fact, and the other was an 
error in judgment. Both kinds of harmful results, however, are covered by the 
term hamartēma.17
In a way similar to arguments in the field of Pauline studies over whether sin 
is an enslaving power, an inherited ontological flaw, or something else, scholars 
of Aristotle have discoursed about whether hamartia is best viewed as a tragic 
flaw, ignorance, or bad judgment (Bremer 1969: 52-56; Halliwell 1998: 202-237; 
Kim 2010; Sherman 1992). The “tragic flaw” interpretation focuses on the motif 
of retribution, and says that the life of the protagonist ends in ruins as a pun-
ishment for his errors and offenses. This interpretation is appealing to some 
degree, but some have pointed out that this reading does not fit a case like the 
Oedipal tragedy, where the wrongdoing did not come about as punishment for 
wrongdoing, but rather because of a series of unintended mistakes (Sherman 
1992: 179). To conclude, though, that the nature of hamartia should be summed 
up as a “mistake of fact,” has problems of its own. Mistakes from circumstantial 
17   Further discussion of intent, agency, and the complications of voluntary and counter- 
voluntary actions may be found in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1.
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ignorance may work for interpreting the nature of the Oedipal hamartia, but 
Aristotle is less interested in tracing the nature of unintended mistakes than 
he is in exploring the relationship between a person’s character and the ensu-
ing hamartemata or hamartiai. He wants to figure out how the many variables 
involved in a person’s desires, thoughts, and beliefs may have come together in 
a way that leads to a tragic end (Sherman 1992: 179-180).
The multiplicity of ways that one may go astray seems to drive Aristotle’s 
analysis of the ideal tragedy in Poetics 13-14. Aristotle maintains that the fin-
est tragedies have complex plots and Stephen Halliwell argues convincingly 
that it is the indeterminacy of a precise definition and function of hamartia 
that enhances the complications of tragedy; he cautions that, “the first point 
which ought to be urged in the interpretation of hamartia, contrary to much 
traditional practice, is that it is not to be extracted from its context and treated 
as a concept or theory complete in itself ” (Halliwell 1998: 215). Based upon 
several different reasons, including the fact that hamartia is “an appositely 
flexible term of Greek moral vocabulary” (and perhaps even more complicated 
by  Poetics 13), Halliwell argues that hamartia ought not be viewed as a tech-
nical designation for a specific Aristotelian doctrine. He also addresses ques-
tions of translation, making a point similar to the one I argue with reference 
to the NT: “no particular English translation evidently recommends itself for 
this term [hamartia]. It is especially difficult to commit oneself to a single 
equivalent in view of the fact that several of the possible candidates—error, 
fault, mistake, flaw—have been closely associated with various attempts to pin 
the word down to a restricted sense,” and, further, that “there is much to be 
said, somewhat ironically, for avoiding a consistent translation for the term” 
(Halliwell 1998: 222).
Before applying Halliwell’s argument directly to NT texts, though, I mention 
a few factors that caution against using the Aristotelian case as a direct ana-
logue. First, in the Poetics, Aristotle focuses on hamartia as one of several fac-
tors to explain the appeal of different sorts of tragedy, and, second, Halliwell’s 
argument for semantic differentiation relies, in part, upon the complicated 
and unstable nature of tragic reversals. While one may regard the NT’s pre-
sentation of hamartia as tragic, the texts themselves are not in any formal 
sense tragedies, nor do any of the texts purport to analyze the components 
of the genre of tragedy. In addition, Aristotle lived and wrote in the 4th cen-
tury BCE, and his use of the term does not necessarily translate into a plau-
sible semantic range for the 1st century CE. A preliminary survey of some texts 
Greek texts from the 1st century, though, shows that there does in fact exist a 
flexible range of meanings attributable to hamartia and its cognates and that 
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the term need not be implicated explicitly with a kind of willful wrongdoing 
against God.18
Through an examination of the writings of Epictetus, for example, one finds 
that hamartia and its cognates are used in a number of ways. Errors in argu-
mentation and logic (Diatribai 1.7.30-33), failure to pay attention (Diatr. 4.12), 
not doing what is appropriate (Diatr. 1.26.5-7), living in the grip of the passions 
(Diatr. 2.1.21-28; 4.1.1-5), and not living according to divine law (Diatr. 3.24.40-
43) all fall under the purview of hamartia, and translators have reflected this 
variety with a range of English terms.
In addition to using hamartia to represent a range of human mistakes or 
errors, Epictetus associates them with ignorance. In one passage, for example, 
Epictetus offers advice about how a child might address a father who is angry 
about his study of philosophy:
Very well then, father, I go astray [hamartanō], not knowing what is 
incumbent upon me or what my duty is. Now if this is a thing that can 
neither be taught nor learned, why do you reproach me? But if it can be 
taught, teach me; and if cannot do this, allow me to learn from those who 
profess to know. Really, what is your idea? That I intentionally fall into 
evil and miss the good? Far from it! What, then, is the cause of my going 
astray [tou hamartanein me]? Ignorance. Very well, do you not want me 
to put away my ignorance? Whom did anger ever teach the art of steering, 
or music? Do you think, then, that your anger will make me learn the art 
of living? (Diatr. 1.26.5-7, Oldfather)
The suggested appeal for education revolves around the claim that going astray 
is the direct result of knowing neither the proper goals of life nor how to pursue 
them. He emphasizes the fact that mistakes involve agency, but that the agency 
is a malleable one that can be remedied with instruction and correction.
Elsewhere, Epictetus considers why it is the case that people tend to be 
more willing to admit a mistake (hamartēma) than an unjust act (adikēma). 
He surmises that “in the case of most errors [hamartēmatōn], the principle 
reason why men are inclined to admit them is that they conceive that there is 
an involuntary element in them, as, for instance, in timidity and pity,” but that 
“injustice [adikon] they do not at all conceive of as involuntary” (Diatr. 2.21.6-7). 
18   While an exhaustive survey would be optimal, this brief summary shows that hamartia 
retains a variety of nuances. Incidentally, neither Epictetus nor Musonius Rufus uses the 
literal meaning of hamartia.
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Although Epictetus attributes such reasoning to confused people,19 the pas-
sage identifies hamartia as a mistake or error and distinguishes it from a will-
fully malicious wrongdoing. 
Epictetus also uses hamartia to refer to more serious offenses such as 
repeated wrongdoings that might only be stopped through an appeal to the 
divine. He describes the state of a person who has made so many mistakes 
he can hardly recognize right from wrong: “But if you be once defeated and 
say that by and by you will overcome, and the second time do the same thing, 
know that at last you will be in so wretched a state and so weak [hexeis kakōs 
kai asthenōs] that by and by you will not so much as notice that you are doing 
wrong [hamartaneis], but you will even begin to offer arguments in justifica-
tion of your conduct” (Diatr. 2.18.31-32). He also offers advice on how one might 
break out of this kind of state: “Remember God; call upon Him to help you and 
stand by your side, just as voyagers, in a storm, call upon the Dioscuri. For what 
storm is greater than that stirred up by powerful impressions which unseat the 
reason?” (Diatr. 2.18.29). In addition to associating one’s release from repeated 
hamartēmata with the divine, Epictetus also uses hamartia to indicate the 
kinds of mistakes that come from living against divine law. In a passage rebuk-
ing those who claim to be Stoics but nevertheless pursue pleasure as a good, 
Epictetus compares such behavior to a false claim upon Roman citizenship:
Well, but those who falsely claim Roman citizenship are severely pun-
ished, and ought those who falsely claim so great and so dignified a calling 
and title [Stoic] to get off scot-free? Or is that impossible? Whereas the 
divine and mighty and inescapable law [ho nomos theios kai ischuros kai 
anapodrastos] is the law which exacts the greatest penalties from those 
who are guilty of the greatest offenses [tōn ta megista hamartanontōn] 
(Diatr. 3.24.41-43).20
Of note is that even in cases where hamartia denotes either a state of wrong-
doing that requires attention to the divine or an offense against God, as in 
Diatr. 2.18.29-32 above, English translations do not use the word sin.21
19   He goes on to say that people are, in some sense, responsible for all sorts of mistakes. 
20    The penalty for one who disobeys divine governance is to “be abject, be a slave, suffer 
grief, envy, pity,—in a word, be miserable and lament” (3.24.43).
21   This holds true not only for the Oldfather translation, but also for others as well. Matheson 
(1916) renders the hamartaneis of 2.18.31 as “you are going wrong,” and Carter (1807) and 
Higginson (1890) as “you do amiss.” Terms used with frequency in all of the mentioned 
 353Reconsidering Hamartia as “Sin” in 1 Corinthians
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 26 (2014) 340-364
Epictetus’s teacher, Musonius Rufus, also uses hamartia and its cognates to 
cover a wide range of situations, with the bulk of the occurrences referring 
not only to mistakes and errors, but also to offenses and more serious wrong-
doings. Civic law-breaking (Musonius 2.5), moral errors (2.12), mistakes in 
 medical care, music, steering (2.13-14), mocking, insulting, or hitting someone 
(10.14-26), adultery (12.20-30), eating without moderation (18B.20-38) and even 
impiety toward the ancestral gods and Zeus (15A.1-21) fall under the purview of 
hamartia. Nevertheless, even with a good deal of the references referring to the 
kinds of wrongs that we might be inclined to say are more serious than a mis-
take, the most recent English translation of Musonius Rufus never once uses 
the word sin, even when the text associates hamartia with an offense of Zeus 
or the ancestral gods (King 2011). Musonius 15, which argues for following civic 
laws that prohibit the prevention of conception and intentional miscarriages, 
connects deviations of these laws with impiety:
By doing this, wouldn’t we be wronging [examartanoimen] both our 
ancestral gods and Zeus, who guards the family? The person who is 
unjust [adikos] towards strangers wrongs [hamartanei] Zeus, the guard-
ian of strangers, and the person who is unjust [adikos] towards his 
friends wrongs Zeus, the god of friendship. Likewise, the person who 
is unjust [adikos] towards his own family wrongs [hamartanei] his 
ancestral gods and Zeus, the protector of families who takes note of 
crimes [hamartēmatōn] connected with families. Anyone who wrongs 
[hamartanōn] the gods is impious [asebēs] (King 2011: 62).
By connecting an act of injustice toward another human with wronging the god 
charged with watching over a particular aspect of human sociality, Musonius 
turns what might today be seen as a civic or secular misdeed into a religious or 
theological one.22 If any use of hamartia would warrant the English translation 
“sin” (based upon considerations of today’s common use of the term), this pas-
sage would surely be in the running. 
Interestingly, King’s 2011 translation deviates from the only other English 
translation in this very manner, for Lutz did use “sin” to translate offenses 
against the gods:
English translations of Epictetus include “error,” “mistake,” “offense,” “fault,” “misbehav-
ior,” “going astray,” “doing wrong,” and “going wrong.”
22   This is not unlike Matthew 25:34-45, which associates the mistreatment of others with the 
mistreatment of the Son of Man, or 1 Cor. 8:12, which equates harming one’s brothers with 
harming Christ himself.
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How can we help committing a sin [examartanoimen] against the gods of 
our fathers and against Zeus, guardian of the race, if we do this? For just 
as the man who is unjust to strangers sins against [hamartanei] Zeus, god 
of hospitality, and one who is unjust to friends sins against Zeus, god of 
friendship, so whoever is unjust to his own family sins against [hamar-
tanei] the gods of his fathers and against Zeus, guardian of the family, 
from whom wrongs [hamartēmatōn] done to the family are not hid-
den, and surely one who sins against [hamartanōn] the gods is impious 
(Lutz 1947: 97, 99).
It was only in these four instances, though, that Lutz used the word sin, and 
I can only speculate that she did so because of the notion of harming or offend-
ing the gods.23
Thus far, the survey of the evolution of hamartia from Homer through 
 Epictetus has shown it to be a flexible term that can cover a variety of human 
actions: missing an intended target in the literal sense, making a mistake in 
logic or argumentation, harming or wronging another person or oneself due 
to a lack of knowledge or poor judgment, behaving in a manner not fitted to a 
particular moral standard, being under the influence of one’s passions, acting 
in an unjust manner while under the sway of the passions, offending the gods, 
and deviating from divine law in a way that brings punishment and suffering 
upon oneself. We have also seen that translators of Greek texts utilizing these 
terms have drawn upon a range of English words in order to account for con-
textual nuance, and that in the case of Aristotelian hamartia, scholars have 
engaged in rigorous debate concerning the ways that the word might best be 
conveyed in the target language. Scholarly discussions in classics and philoso-
phy have been marked by divergent interpretations of the “Aristotelian doc-
trine of hamartia” and by detailed arguments about the precise meaning not 
only of the term but also of an over-arching theory of human error.
The same may be said of scholarly discussions in fields such as early 
Christianity and theology about a “New Testament doctrine of sin” or, more fre-
quently, a “Pauline doctrine of sin.” But whereas certain figures in the study of 
Aristotelian hamartia have sought to push back against a formalized doctrine, 
the technical nature of the term, and even rigid translation practices, this kind 
of critical discourse is sorely lacking in the study of the NT. In the final section 
of this essay I offer a starting point for this kind of critical discourse by showing 
that in at least one NT text, 1 Corinthians, hamartia reflects some of the flex-
23   Note that the fourth occurrence in the passage is translated as “wrongs,” presumably 
because it is an offense against humans rather than against gods.
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ibility seen in the literature already surveyed and by arguing that the English 
word “sin” is not a helpful translation. Before turning to 1 Corinthians, though, 
we must ask whether 1st century Greek texts dealing with Judean traditions 
will add any further options to the semantic range of hamartia.
As with Musonius Rufus and Epictetus, Philo of Alexandria uses hamartia 
and related terms in many ways, ranging from inaccurate statements (De opifi-
cio mundi 21, 47; De posteritate Caini 57-58) and perceptual errors (De Cherubim 
65-66, 70), to having irrational passions (De Specialibus legibus 1.190-191) and 
bad intentions (Legum alligoriae 2.61), to speaking against the Lord (Leg. 2.78) 
and not properly recognizing the true God or following his ways (Spec. 1.53, 
79). Hamartēmata may be committed against humans or gods (Spec. 1.100, 234), 
are evaluated with respect to the intention of the agent (Spec. 1.227, 235, 260), 
and often stem from a lack of knowledge or improper education (Spec. 1.53, 
79). But unlike other authors in our survey, there are different variables at play. 
One variable common to nearly all Greek texts dealing with Judean traditions 
is the history of the transmission of concepts from Hebrew to Greek via the 
Septuagint. The Septuagint contains cases of semantic expansion, where one 
Hebrew root is translated into a number of different Greek terms, as happens 
in Ezekiel 33-34, where the Hebrew term ’wn, commonly translated as “mis-
deed,” is translated into four different Greek words to account for differentia-
tion in political context: anomia (“lawlessness”), asebeia (“impiety”), hamartia 
(“sin”), and adikia (“injustice”) (Hubler 2007: 947), but more often the trend 
is toward semantic leveling, where a number of different Hebrew roots have 
been gathered under a smaller number of Greek terms (Quell 1964: 267-271).24 
At issue with semantic leveling is a greater emphasis on hamartia as a multi-
purpose term that can cover a very broad range of actions including bending or 
twisting (’wh), rebelling (psh’), and erring (shgh). Another complication is that 
although hamartia is regularly used in the LXX for the Hebrew ht’, hamartia 
only conveys one aspect of the Hebrew term. Ht’ refers both to wrongdoing and 
to the ritual used to remove it, and yet hamartia indicates only the former; thus 
there is some confusion in the Greek that is cleared up by English translations 
using “sin” and “sin-offering” to account for context (Perkins 2007: 45).
A second variable is the inclusion of the Judean categories of ritual and 
moral impurity and their potential overlap with hamartia. Philo of Alexandria, 
for example, associates moral impurity (but not ritual impurity) with  hamartia, 
24   Although there are others, the four Hebrew verbs that are most often translated as hamar-
tia in the LXX are ht’, psh’, ’wh, and shgh (Quell 1964: 270-271).
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and emphasizes the importance of purifying one’s soul.25 Neither the associa-
tion of an impure soul with hamartia nor the goal of purifying one’s soul is 
uniquely Judean; nevertheless, emphasis upon sacrificial acts and atonement 
for an impure soul and a posited analogical relationship with ritual impurity 
and ritual purification (Philo, Spec. 1.256-261, for example) is not found outside 
those texts concerned with Judean traditions. Thus in addition to the range 
of options already discussed for hamartia, when we turn to 1 Corinthians, we 
will also have another option associated with the Judean concept of moral 
 impurity.
3 Hamartia in 1 Corinthians
Hamartia and its cognates (hamartano, hamartolos, and prohamartano), 
appear in five of Paul’s seven undisputed letters: Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, 
1 Thessalonians, and Galatians. Taken together, there are 83 occurrences in 
these letters, all of which are translated as “sin” in the New Revised Standard 
Version (NRSV) and the Revised Standard Version (RSV).26 In what follows, 
I examine each of the occurrences of hamartia in 1 Corinthians in order to show 
that semantic differentiation in the target language is possible, historically 
plausible, and can offer several benefits that contribute to a better understand-
ing of Paul’s ideas about morality. Much more could be said with reference to 
the content of each of the passages under discussion, but I limit the discussion 
to points directly related to the issues of semantic flexibility and translation.
There are 12 occurrences of hamartia-related terms in 1 Corinthians, the first 
two of which are found in 1 Cor 6:18:
The body is meant not for fornication but for the Lord, and the Lord for 
the body. And God raised the Lord and will also raise us by his power. Do 
you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Should I therefore 
take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? 
Never! Do you not know that whoever is united with a prostitute becomes 
25   Philo follows the Biblical tradition in associating “sin” with moral impurity but not with 
ritual impurity; his innovation is the analogical relationship between the two (Klawans 
2000, 64-66).
26   In fact, of the 269 occurrences of hamartia and its cognates in the NT, all but two (Acts 
25:8 and 1 Peter 2:20) are translated as “sin.” As mentioned previously, the focus of the 
study is on the NRSV because of its reputation as the best translation to use in academic 
settings. 
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one body with her? For it is said, “The two shall be one flesh.” But anyone 
united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him. Shun fornication! Every 
sin [pan hamartēma] that a person commits is outside the body; but the 
fornicator sins [hamartanei] against the body itself. Or do you not know 
that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have 
from God, and that you are not your own? For you were bought with a 
price; therefore glorify God in your body. (1 Cor 6:13b-20, NRSV)
An injunction against fornication is found in 6:13b and 6:18, and interwoven 
with this injunction is evidence that Paul thinks the hamartēma under dis-
cussion might be remedied with further teaching. He repeats the phrase, “do 
you not know,” three times, and follows it each time with instruction. First, 
that human bodies can be “members of Christ”; second, that the union of one 
of those members with sexual impurity pollutes that body, and by extension, 
both the other “members of Christ” and the spirit ( pneuma) of the Lord; third, 
that one’s body contains “the holy spirit” ( pneuma) from God and that there-
fore the body belongs to God. 
Paul’s exhortation toward what he takes to be proper moral behavior rests 
upon the concept of participation in Christ, which he explains in the three 
points about the ways in which bodies can mix, via the divine spirit ( pneuma), 
both with each other and with Christ. He notes that the intermixing of human 
bodies with the pneuma can result in cross-contamination. Viewed within a 
realist version of participation in Christ, Paul would be explaining that differ-
ent types of materials interpenetrate each other and thus can either contami-
nate or purify one another (Stowers 2008: 357-360). This concept of mixing or 
interpenetration is, for Paul, extremely powerful; powerful enough to explain 
human relatedness, physical participation in Christ, and the potential dangers 
of physically mixing with the wrong kind of people. Paul seems to think that 
if only the Corinthians knew about the potential consequences, they would 
not intermingle themselves with anything harmful, never mind a prostitute. 
Through his emphasis on a lack of knowledge, Paul implies that the mistake 
was made because of ignorance or improper education. He thinks that having 
the knowledge would be enough to convince a person not to engage in fornica-
tion, and thus he explains how moral impurity can serve to compromise the 
integrity both of the individual and of the group. Becoming one flesh, not just 
figuratively but physically, can corrupt one’s own being, other members of the 
body of Christ, and Christ himself.
In this light, Paul’s use of hamartia in 1 Cor 6:18 is consistent with the kind 
of misguided behavior that results from a lack of knowledge. Paul attempts 
to curtail this behavior through instruction, which shows that he views the 
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injurious actions either as mistakes based upon an ignorance of certain facts 
(the laws of intermixing) or upon an error of judgment (the bad choice of sex-
ual partners). I see no compelling reason to use the word “sin” in this passage; 
if we want to align the target language with the source language, then sin (used 
to designate a willful or voluntary offense against god, with possible soteriolog-
ical implications) is technically not an inappropriate translation. The primary 
problem addressed by Paul is one of ignorance or bad judgment, which results 
in harm to individual and corporate purity. Perhaps a fitting translation would 
be, “Every misdeed that a person commits is outside the body; but the fornica-
tor wrongs the body itself.” Here, “misdeed” captures the idea that the person 
did something against moral purity, but that it was not an action chosen with 
full knowledge of the implications, while “wrongs” highlights the fact that the 
misdeed does in fact have injurious potential.
The next three occurrences are in 1 Cor 7, which deals with the potential 
conflict arising from a constellation of issues revolving around desire, self- 
control, service to the Lord, and marriage. Like the last passage, Paul offers 
a teaching designed to enable his readers to make better choices about 
their behavior:
In whatever condition you were called, brothers and sisters, there remain 
with God. Now concerning virgins, I have no command of the Lord, but 
I give my opinion as one who by the Lord’s mercy is trustworthy. I think 
that, in view of the impending crisis, it is well for you to remain as you 
are. Are you bound to a wife? Do not seek to be free. Are you free from a 
wife? Do not seek a wife. But if you marry, you do not sin [ouch hēmartes] 
and if a virgin marries, she does not sin [ouch hēmarten]. Yet those who 
marry will experience distress in this life, and I would spare you that. 
I mean, brothers and sisters, the appointed time has grown short . . . 
(7:24-29a, NRSV)
Here, Paul encourages the Corinthians to remain as they are with reference to 
marital status, with emphasis on the fact that this is not an exhortation from 
God, but rather Paul’s own speculative advice. This alone should speak against 
using the word sin. It is clear that a willful violation of divine law or God’s will is 
impossible in this case because there is no divine decree to violate! Within the 
context of 1 Cor 7, Paul’s discussion of marriage falls into an ethical category 
known as the moral indifferents (adiaphora), which is to say that the appropri-
ate behavior depends not upon a particular action’s being inherently good or 
bad, but instead upon the circumstance and context in which a person finds 
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him or herself. Paul does offer an argument against marriage, to the effect that 
it would add undue distress to one’s life, but this distress would be tolerable 
and in fact welcome in light of a worse possibility, namely, not exercising self-
control: “If anyone thinks that he is not behaving properly toward his  fiancée, 
if his passions are strong, and so it has to be, let him marry as he wishes; it is no 
sin [ouch hamartanei]. Let him marry” (1 Cor 7:35-36). Here, too, Paul offers his 
own speculation about which kinds of actions would be better than others and 
thus appears to be saying that the marriage in itself is not wrong, but rather 
the circumstances and the state of mind leading up to the marriage. For these 
passages in 1 Cor 7, then, I suggest “But if you marry, you do not do wrong and 
if a virgin marries, she does not do wrong” and “let him marry as he wishes; it 
is not wrong. Let him marry.”
The situation in 1 Cor 8 resembles that of 1 Cor 6 insofar as Paul attempts to 
remedy problematic behavior by explaining that the behavior has implications 
beyond what might have been expected:
Since some have become so accustomed to idols until now, they still 
think of the food they eat as food offered to an idol; and their conscience, 
being weak, is defiled. ‘Food will not bring us close to God.’ We are no 
worse off if we do not eat, and no better off if we do. But take care that 
this liberty of yours does not somehow become a stumbling block to the 
weak. For if others see you, who possess knowledge, eating in the temple 
of an idol, might they not, since their conscience is weak, be encouraged 
to the point of eating food sacrificed to idols? So by your knowledge those 
weak believers for whom Christ dies are destroyed. But when you thus sin 
[hamartanontes] against members of your family, and wound their con-
science when it is weak, you sin [hamartanete] against Christ. Therefore, 
if food is a cause of their failing, I will never eat meat, so that I may not 
cause one of them to fall. (8:10-13, NRSV)
In this passage, some who have rightly understood that there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with any kind of food, even that which has been sacrificed to idols, 
are being observed by others who do not yet understand this concept. Seeing 
others eating meat that they think is polluted has somehow caused problems 
for those who do not yet understand that meat is neither good nor bad in itself. 
Thus the knowledge that frees people from worrying about what types of food 
to eat has been misunderstood, and has led to destruction. The problem clearly 
involves the inadvertent harming of family members (presumably those who 
are “members of Christ”) and by extension, of Christ. As with the 1 Cor 6 
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passage, the action, while inadvertent, nevertheless causes harm and so I sug-
gest, “But when you thus do wrong against members of your family, and wound 
their conscience when it is weak, you do wrong against Christ.”
The final five occurrences are in 1 Cor 15, and here the usage of the term is 
different. Rather than referring to particular actions that he finds problematic, 
Paul uses hamartia within a constellation of terms depicting the differences 
between the dusty, perishable, weak and mortal existence of humans since 
Adam and the heavenly, imperishable, powerful and immortal existence of 
those resurrected with Christ:
There are both heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, but the glory of 
the heavenly is one thing, and that of the earthly is another. There is 
one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of 
the stars; indeed, star differs from star in glory. So it is with the resurrec-
tion of the dead. What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperish-
able. It is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, 
it is raised in power. It is sown in a physical body, it is raised in a spiri-
tual body. If there is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body. Thus 
it is written, “The first man, Adam, became a living being”; the last Adam 
became a life-giving spirit. But it is not the spiritual that is first, but the 
physical, and then the spiritual. The first man was from the earth, a man 
of dust; the second man is from heaven. As was the man of dust, so are 
those who are of the dust; and as is the man of heaven, so are those who 
are of heaven. Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we will 
also bear the image of the man of heaven. What I am saying, brothers and 
sisters, is this: flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor 
does the perishable inherit the imperishable (1 Cor 15:40-50).
The dichotomy between the earthly and the heavenly man is borne out through 
the differing value of each kind’s physicality, representing two ends of a quali-
tative spectrum of substance (or, a hierarchy of being, Stowers 2008: 355-356). 
According to this spectrum, it is only natural that the lower, earthly end would 
be characterized by mortality (death), weakness, and a host of other related or 
corollary features. Concerning the human, these traits would naturally include 
problems such as mental and emotional weaknesses manifesting themselves 
in overwhelming passions, ignorance, bad judgment, and other flaws of char-
acter that lead to harmful, hurtful, and injurious behavior. Despite this being 
the natural condition for dusty, mortal men, Paul nevertheless exhorts the 
Corinthians to try to keep a clear head and thus not go astray: “Come to a sober 
and right mind and sin no more [mē hamartanete]; for some people have no 
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knowledge of God. I say this to your shame” (1 Cor 15:34). Beings at this lower 
end of the spectrum of substance are prone to do wrong and make mistakes 
by the very nature of their physicality, but it does not mean that Paul will not 
encourage them to do better. I suggest the translation, “Come to a sober and 
right mind and do not go astray”; Paul is not accusing the Corinthians of will-
ful deviations from God’s will. Rather, he is exhorting them to pull themselves 
together as best they can and stop making the kinds of mistakes that will only 
result in further distress.
When Paul associates hamartia with death, he is simply articulating one 
aspect of the imperfect set of features attributed to those inhabiting the lower 
end of the spectrum:
“Where, O death, is your victory?
Where, O death, is your sting?”
The sting of death is sin [hē hamartia], and the power of sin [hē dunamis 
tēs hamartias] is the law (1 Cor 15:55-56).
Again, because Paul is describing the natural situation of humankind, use of 
the word sin here seems overwrought, and I see no reason why the passage 
could not read, “The sting of death is wrongdoing and the power of wrongdo-
ing is the law.” But, according to Paul, although humans may now be dwelling 
in the lower part of existence, they will soon be resurrected and inhabit the 
upper end: “Listen, I will tell you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will all be 
changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the 
trumpet will sound and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be 
changed. For this perishable body must put on imperishability, and this mortal 
body must put on immortality” (1 Cor 15:51-53). This change happens through 
human resurrection, but the possibility of human resurrection depends upon 
Christ’s resurrection: “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you 
are still in your sins [tais hamartiais humōn]” (1 Cor 15:17). As an alternative, 
this passage could read, “and you are still in your misdeeds.” The emphasis is 
upon the movement from the earthly weakened state of being to the heavenly 
one; “misdeeds” captures the actions stemming from mental weakness and 
error better than “sins.”
Paul’s use of hamartia and its cognates in 1 Cor aligns neither with the mod-
ern understanding that sin is a willful offense against God that often comes 
with soteriological consequences nor with the idea that sin is a congenital 
angst that bears itself out as the kind of guilt that only Christ can fix. We saw 
that in 1 Cor 6 and 8, Paul identified certain behaviors as wrongdoings or mis-
deeds because they were done out of ignorance. In particular, the misdeeds 
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were carried out because the agents did not realize that the actions had such 
far-reaching consequences with regard to moral purity and the integrity of the 
individual and the corporate body. Further, we saw that in 1 Cor 7, Paul set 
forth his own moral advice about marriage but qualified his advice by saying 
that those who did not follow it were not really going astray because circum-
stance might dictate a different course of action. Finally, in 1 Cor 15, Paul asso-
ciates hamartia with a set of characteristics that he understands to be defining 
features of earthly human beings: dusty, mortal, weak, and prone to clouded 
thinking that can lead to harmful behaviors and moral failures. It is with this 
last usage of hamartia, that I propose a slight modification to what is often 
taken to be a central teaching of Pauline thought:
For I handed on to you as of first importance what I in turn had received: 
that Christ died for our shortcomings [tōn hamartiōn hēmōn] in accor-
dance with the scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he was raised 
on the third day in accordance with the scriptures, and that he appeared 
to Cephas, then to the twelve (1 Cor 15:3-5).
If “Christ died for our shortcomings” does not sound as dramatic as “Christ dies 
for our sins,” then my choice was apt. While it may feel comfortable and famil-
iar to assume that Paul and his readers would have understood hamartia to 
mean the same thing that “sin” means for English speakers today, a close read-
ing of his use of the term in 1 Cor simply does not support such an assumption.
As this study has shown, translation practices concerning the Greek word 
hamartia diverge between scholars who focus on different sets of literature. 
In literature traditionally defined as philosophical, hamartia is translated in 
a variety of ways to account for the multiple ways that an agent’s intentions 
can result in harmful, wrong, or less-than-ideal actions. This variety is retained, 
to some extent, in the translation of Judean texts, but virtually disappears in 
English translations of the New Testament. The divergent practices trade 
upon modern assumptions about the nature of religion in antiquity and the 
essentially religious nature of the concept of sin. Perhaps because of the still- 
pervasive Augustinian-Lutheran idea that Paul’s letters are expressions of the 
universal human problem of sin and thus, as Krister Stendahl puts it, “docu-
ments of human consciousness,” translators have been unable to bring them-
selves to move away from the word sin and all that it entails (Stendahl 1963: 199). 
In light of ancient evidence for the flexibility of hamartia, it becomes difficult 
to believe that not only Paul but also all of the other New Testament authors 
whose writings span roughly 70 years and originate from multiple geographical 
locales, could have used the term in only one way. The monolithic translation 
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of hamartia as sin, then, seems to stem from ideology rather than from atten-
tion to philology or history. Placing modern theological understandings of sin 
onto authoritative religious texts through unreflective translation practices 
not only produces anachronism but it also reinforces the supposed truth of 
those theological concepts in a way that protects them from critical analysis.
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